The "Pax Americana" and its implications for the security, stability and peace of South America by Martín, Félix
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(Resumen)
En este artículo, se analiza la hipótesis de la "paz hegemónica" en el contexto histórico
suramericano de paz regional, desde finales de la Guerra del Chaco entre Bolivia y Paraguay , en
1935. En la primera parte de este estudio, se formula un planteamiento sobre las implicaciones
teóricas de la proposición enunciada y se traza un plan de estudio para constatar su valor
explicativo. A continuación, se realiza una especie de reconstrucción de lo que ha sido la
posición política de los Estados Unidos de América ante los posibles brotes de violencia y crisis
militarizadas entre las naciones del continente suramericano. Una vez que se ha concluido que
los Estados Unidos de América han mantenido históricamente una postura clara y directa en
favor de la paz regional, se busca comprobar si, en efecto, su poder político-militar ha sido un
factor determinante para evitar guerras y mantener la paz interestatal en ese continente. Después
de una profunda indagación sobre la evidencia histórica, se llega a concluir que el poder y los
intereses estadounidenses no han sido factores más determinantes que el papel jugado por otros
Estados vecinos. De hecho, se afirma que la relación causa-efecto entre la hegemonía
estadounidense y la paz interestatal en América del Sur desde 1935 es muy tenue para ser
considera da como una de las explicaciones concluyentes de tal fenómeno histórico.
Edward D. Mansfield examines the relationship among the intemational distribution of
power, trade and war, and concludes that "like all interstate wars , non-major-power wars begin
more frequently during periods of hegemony than during non-hegemonic periods . .. " I One of he
implications of this finding is that hegemony does not lead automatically to interstate arder ,
stability and peace, as postulated originally by power preponderance theorists and other realists.
In particular, this general finding stands in sharp contrast with the view held by many
mainstream realists, as well as several area specialists, who maintain that the outbreak and
permanence of interstate peace in South America is a direct consequence of United States
hegernony.' The purpose ofthis study is to evaluate empirically the explanatory value ofthe
hegemonic peace hypothesis, connecting the power and interest of the United States with the
evolution and permanence of intraregional interstate peace in South America since 1935.
1. Edward D. Mansfield, Power, Trade, and War . Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.
97 and 108.
2. See chapter two. 85-87,73-74.
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1. HEGEMONY ANDPEACE: OPERATIONALIZATIONOFA POWERRELATION
When intemational relations theorists and students of South American intraregional
politics link causally U.S. hegemony and the outbreak and maintenance of interstate peace in
South America, they are in effect asserting a causal power relation in which the capabilities and
interests of actor "A" alone cause or inf1uence a change in the intemational behavior of one,
several, or all actors within the same region . In this sense , to postulate that U.S. hegemony
causes interstate peace in South America is methodologically equivalent to adopting a first-
face-of-power causal relationship which entails two elements: first, the initiator or power source
and, second, the receiver or target ofpower. Accordingly , in order to evaluate the robustness of
such a power relationship, it is necessary to establish, first , the undisputed hegemonic role of
the United States, and the identification of its national interest with the goal to promote and
preserve interstate peace in South America.
Since it is undeniable that for over a century now the United States has been the most
powerful and inf1uential actor in the Americas, I will assume its hegemony in South America
and the subordinate roles of the other states in the region. Further, in order to gauge historically
the interest level of the United States in promoting and maintaining interstate peace in the area,
I will identify its publicly stated policy goal towards the region and, then, contrast it with its
actual behavior, that is, the degree of tangible commitment and involvement. AIso, I will
compare U.S. goals in same with other regions, e.g., Africa , South East Asia, and the Middle
East where it has been more involved militarily and politically than in South America. The
objective of this line of inquiry is to determine how resolute, assertive , and successful has the
United States been in promot ing and maintaining interstate peace and security in South America
since 1935. In other words, I will try to answer the following question : Has the United States
been willing to put its military might and treasure at the service of its stated principies and
goals? To ascerta in U.S. commitment, close attention will be paid to those moments of crises in
South America when an immediate response from the U.S. could have averted further
intemational complications.
The rece iving end or target is the second element in a first-face-of-power causal
relationship. From this angle , I will ascerta in the level of compliance by the South American
states with U.S. policy goals and directives regarding intraregional interstate peace and security.
For that spec ific purpose I will establish, first, the original demands of individual disputants .
Then, I will contrast these with their latest negotiating positions or final outcome in the dispute.
This is intended to gauge how much have the contenders agreed to compromise their original
demands in order to comply with U.S. directives .
2. SOURCE OF POWER: U.S. MIGHT AND EVOLUTION OF ITS NATIONAL
INTEREST IN LA TIN AMERICA
Consistent with realist precepts, the primary interest of any country in the world,
includin g that of the United States , is to ensure its own military, political , and economic
security. To satisfy that end states develop a set of goals and irnplernent their foreign policy to
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attain them. Consistent with this logic, the hegemonic peace hypothesis advances the notion that
the United States sought to protect and advance its national interest in Latin America by
pursuing a two-pronged approach . First, it sought to prevent and exclude the influence and
control of extra-hemispheric powers in the region. Second, it favored and encouraged national
and regional political stability and peace. In other words, the United States has been keenly
interested in maintaining peaceful intraregional relat ions and preventing violent and sudden
regime changes in Latin America. Its objective has been to forestall involvement opportunities
in Latin America to any rival, extra-continental Great Power?
Prior to the Spanish-American-Cuban War of 1898, U.S. policy towards Latin
America was characterized by a "benign neglect. ,,4 Except for the 1846 war against Mexico, the
United States did not display a marked interest in the internal and intraregional affairs of Latin
American countries. Still itself engaged in the process of nation-building, economically and
militarily weak, and totally surrounded by ideologically and militarily hostile European powers,
the early the US opted for a cautious position by tuming its diplomatic attention to Europe as a
tactic to gain European support for the democratic experiment at home.s
Subsequent to the Spanish-American-Cuban War and the rise of the United States to
great power status , its Latin American policy has oscillated between interventionist and
noninterventionist periods. During interventionist periods , the U.S. has undertaken an active
role in preventing political instability and the penetration of extra-hemispheric influences in the
region, particularly in the Caribbean and Central American sub-regions . To accomplish these
objectives the U.S. has intervened militarily in the internal affairs of these countries, and has
underrnined and destabilized governments through economic and political means. It is
important to point out here, however, that the intensity of the interventionist policy has varied
3. For different analyzes ofU.S. interests and goals in Latin America, see Harrison Wagner, R.
United States Policy Toward Latin America: A Study in Dom estic and lnternational Politics .
Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press, 1970. 11-43; M. Coleman , Kenneth . "The Polit ical
Mythology of the Monroe Doctrine : Reflections on the Social Psychology of Hegemony," in
Martz , John D. and Lars Schoultz , eds. Latin America, the United Sta tes, and the lnter-
American System. Boulder , Colorado: Westview Press, 1980.95-114; Daly Hayes, Margaret.
Latin America and the UiS, National lnterest : A Basis for UiS, Foreign Policy . Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1984. 1-19; G. Gil, Federico . "The Kennedy-Johnson Years," in
John D. Martz , ed. United States Policy in Latin America: A Quart er Century of Crisis and
Challenge, 1961-1986. Lincoln, Nebraska: University ofNebraska Press, 1988.3; Pope Atkins,
G. Latin America in the lnternational Political System , 2nd ed. Boulder , Colorado : Westview
Press, 1989. 108-134; Blachman , Morris J. "U.S. Interests in South Amer ica," in G. Pope
Atkins, ed. South America lnto the 1990's: Evol ving lnternational Relationships in a New Era.
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990. 121-141; and Michael J. Kryzanek, Leaders ,
Leadership, and U'S. Policy in Latin America. Boulder, Colorado : Westview, 1992. 39-59.
4. Pope Atkins, G. Latin America in the lnternational Political System . 37; and Arthur P.
Whitaker, The United Sta tes and the Southern Cone : Argent ina , Chile, and Uruguay.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976.355.
5. Michael J. Kryzanek, US.-Latin American Relations. New York: Praeger, 1990.21.
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considerably over time and according to the specific sub-regions involved. For example, while
U.S. military interventions have been routine in Central America and the Caribbean basin, none
has ever taken place in any of the South American republics . Perhaps that may be the result of
the relative power ofkey local states and/or their remote geographical distance from the United
States. In fact, sorne countries in South America are further away from the United States than
many countries in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Europe. On the other hand,
noninterventionist periods have been characterized by the fulfillment of U.S. national interests
in Latin America via friendly, cooperative diplomatic negotiations, based on mutual respect and
understanding.
Despite periodic oscillations in the Latin American policy of the United States, it is
evident that the U.S. has pursued consistently and continuously the exclusion of extra -
continental rivals from the Western Hemisphere, and the maintenance of stable political
regimes capable of safeguarding its national interests. The Monroe Doctrine is the earliest
public manifestation ofU.S. intentions and interests in Latin America. In June 19, 1822 Gran
Colombia became the first Latin American nation to receive diplomatic recognition by the
United States, 6 and on December 2, 1823, President James Monroe issued a warning to the
European powers against trying to recolonize the regi ón." In that statement President Monroe
not only acknowledged the essential differences between the political systems of the European
powers and that of the United States . More importantly, he proceeded to identify and stress the
first and most vital U.S. political goal in Latin America. President Monroe warned the
Europeans that
we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of
this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety . With the existing colonies or
dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere.
But with the Governments who have declared their independence and maintained it,
and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principIes,
acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing
them , or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any
other light than as the manifestation of a unfriendly disposition toward the United
States.8
6. For a chronology and analysis ofthe process of diplomatic recognition by the United States
of the newly independent states in Latin America, see G. Gil, Federico. Latin American-United
Sta tes Relations. New York : Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1971. 22-24; and Spencer
Robertson, William . Hispanic American Relations with the United States. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1923. 26-42.
7. For a historical analysis ofthe circumstances and events leading up to the formulation ofthe
Monroe Doctrine, see Lieuwen, Edwin . U.S. Policy in Latin America: A Short History. New
York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1965. 3-20 .
8. Emphasis added . For a fuller version of President James Monroe statement, see Karnes,
Thomas L., ed. Readings in The Latin American Policy o/the United States . Tucson , Arizona:
The University of Arizona Press, 1972.37-40.
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In four other subsequent instances the spirit and application of the Monroe Doctrine
have been reaffirmed, strengthened, and expanded further, underlining the true interest and
purpose of the United States in Latin America. First, a bitter civil war between thc Spanish
population and Indians of Mayan descent on the peninsula of Yucatan prompted Yucatecan
officials to appeal for aid concurrentIy from the United States, Great Britain, and Spain.
Concerned that either the British or the Spaniards could regain inf1uence and control of
Mexican territory, President James K. Polk addressed the two houses of Congress in April
1848. In his appeal for aid for the Yucatecans, he argued that
Whilst still considering Yucatan as a portion of Mexico, if we had troops to spare for
this purpose, 1 would deem it proper, during the continuance of the war with Mexic o,
to occupy and hold military possession of her territory, and to defend the wh ite
inhabitants against the incursion of the Indians, in the same way that we have
employed our troops in other states of the Mexican republic in our possession, in
repelling the attacks of savages upon the inhabitants, who have maintained their
neutrality in the war ... 1 subm it to the wisdom of Congress to adopt such measures as,
in their judgment, may be expedient, to prevent Yucatan from becoming a colony 01
any European power, which, in no eventocould be permitted by the United States; and,
at the same time, to rescue the white race from extermination or expuls ion from their
9
country.
Evidently, this passage reveals that the U.S. was not only willing to protect the
independence and sovereignty of the newly created republics in Latin America aga inst
European encroachment, but , also, to intervene in their internal affairs to avert involvement
opportunities in Latin America to rival European powers . The crisis in Yucatan underscores the
importance for U.S. interests in Latin America to maintain domestic stability and peace. This is
something that in subsequent events in inter-American affairs beco mes more evident and easier
to identify as one ofthe central goals ofU.S. policy toward Latin America.
A second episode, which enabled U.S. officials to strengthen the spirit of the Monroe
Doctrine, occurred on July 20, 1895, when the United States, demonstrating a marked degree of
assertiveness, defied Great Britain in its dispute with Venezuela over the boundary with British
Guiana. On that occas ion, President Grover Cleveland ordered his Secretary of State, Rich ard
Olney, to dispatch a long, aggressive note to the British government discussing the disput e,
condemning British policy, and insisting upon impartial arbitration. For our purpose here ,
however, the most interesting and revealing aspects ofOlney's Corollary to the Monroe
Doctrine are , first , the reaffirmation of U.S. intent to prevent European meddling in the
Americas, particularIy in countries like Venezuela, situated on the Caribbean littoral , an area of
9. Emphasis added , see Karnes, ed. Readings in The Latin American Policy ofthe United States.
106-107.
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greater importance to U.S. national interests than the South American sUb-re§ion, and, second,
the public declaration ofU.S. hegemony in this sub-region in Latin America. 1
The third and, perhaps, the broadest extension ofthe Monroe Doctrine was promulgated by
President Theodore Roosevelt on December 6, 1904. Prior to the unveiling of Roosevelt's
Corollary , Germany, Great Britain, and Italy had blockaded Venezuela to enforce their financial
claims . These were subsequently settled in favor ofthe European powers at The Hague Court of
Arbitration. Then, again, in 1904, when European powers threatened to use force against the
Dominican Republíc to collect defaulted debts, and mindful that, perhaps, a precedent for the
use of force in the collection of national debts had been set, President Roosevelt explained in
his annual message to Congress that
Al! that this country desires is to see the neighboring countries stable, orderly, and
prosperous. Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our
hearty friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency
and decency in social and polítical matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it
need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an
impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties ofcivilized society. may in
America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in
the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine
may force the United States , however reluctantly, in flagrant cases ofsuch wrongdoing
or impotence. to the exercise ofan international police power. 1I
Finally , in 1912 there were rumors that Japanese investors were considering the
purchase from a U.S. company of a large strip ofland near Magdalena Bay in Mexican Baja
California. Since U.S. policymakers assumed that such an acquisition by a Japanese firm would
threaten U.S. national security, the Department ofState ordered the American company to stop
negotiations with the Japanese investors because they violated the Monroe Doctrine. This was
the situation when Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, introduced a resolution stating that
When any harbor or other place in the American continents is so situated that the
occupation thereof for naval or military purposes might threaten the communications
or the safety of the United States , the Government of the United States could not see
without grave concern the possession of such harbor or other place by any corporation
10. For Richard Olney's pronouncernent, see Bartleu , Ruhl J., ed. The Record ofAmerican
Diplomacy: Documents and Readings in the History of American Foreign Relations, 3rd ed.
New York: AlfredA . Knopf, 1954.344-345.
11. Emphas is added, quoted in Bartlett , ed . The Record of Am erican Diplomacy: Documents
ami Readings in the History ofA merican Foreign Relatio ns, 3rd ed . 539.
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or association which has such a relation to another Government, not American, as to
give that Government practical power of control for national purposes ...12
While this resolution received Senate approval, it was never endorsed by the
administration of President William Howard Tan. Nonetheless, the passage of this resolution
underscored furt he r the significance for U.S . foreign policy interests of preventing the
involvement of extra-continental powers in Latin America. The Lodge Corollary extended this
principie for the first time to an Asian power.
The Monroe Doctrine, together with Polk's, Olney's , Roosevelt's , and Lodges's
Corollaries, establish clearly three basic points regarding U.S. interests in Latin America: First ,
it is clearly demonstrated that the primary interest of the United States is to prevent the
involvement of rival extra-continental powers in the Americas. This is a common theme
running from the Monroe Doctrine to Lodge's Corollary. Second, that in order to thwart great
power interference in the Western Hemisphere, the United States is willing to intervene in the
domestic affairs of Latin American countries. And, third, the United States considers itself as
the regional hegemon, with authority to lead the countries of Latin America.
With respeet to the issue of intraregional interstate conflict and war, the Monroe
Doctr ine and the four corollaries discussed aboye remained silent. Interestingly enough,
however , this aspec t of inte r-A merican affairs has been dealt with somewhat differently from
the issues of European and Japanese involvement in the Americas, and of domestic political
turm oil in the Latin American republies. While U.S . policy has been forceful and harsh
regarding these two points, it has been, on the other hand , aceommodating and soft on the issue
of inte rstate disputes in South America. Since the early inception of inter-Ameriean affairs, the
policy of the United States has been to remain politically neutral and non -commillal regarding
the use of military power as a conflict-settling mechanism,
Favoring neutrality and the bargaining table over the use of military power, the United
States has tried to nudge the real and potential belligerents toward diplomatic negot iations and
peaeeful settlernents of conflicts and wars. In other words, there is no evidence that the U.S.
ever exerted real power to compel peaceful resolution of local intraregional interstate disputes.
For example, when in the course of the first South American intraregional interstate conflict,
republican Argentina inquired whether its war with imperial Brazil (1824-1828) was not a
violation of Monroe's Doctrine on the part of Brazil, Secretary of State Henry Clay replied that
such a purely American war would not bear the "remotest analogy to the case which President
Mo nroe's message deprecates."13 This reaction sent a clear signalto the newly created republics
in South America: the United States could not and would not intervene militarily in
intraregional interstate conflicts in South America, either to coerce belligerents into peaceful
12. Kames, ed . Readings in ril e Latín American Poli cy ofthe United Sta tes . 208.
13. As discussed and quoted by Karnes, ed Readings in ril e Latín Am erican Policy of the
Unite d Stat es . 104.
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coexistence , or to deter potential local revisionist states. 14 Also, the United States maintained a
distance from South American during the La Plata War (1836-1852) fought by Argentine
rebels , allied with Brazil and Uruguay, against the dictatorship of Juan Manuel de Rosa in
Argentina , and then, again, during the Paraguayan War, or War of the Triple AlIiance, fought
by Paraguay against Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay (1864-1870).
lt was not until the 1880's that the United States opted for a more direct and involved
approach to the question of interstate conflict and war in South America. Upon becoming
Secretary of State in President James A. Garfield's administration, James G. Blaine
implemented a new policy toward Latin America . As described and explained by diplomatic
historian Alexander DeConde:
Blaine's policy toward Latin America had two main objectives : promotion ofpeace and
increased trade ... Peace, he believed ... called for effort on his part to try to end
turbulence and wars then sweeping over parts of Latin America ...15
The initial effort toward the attainment of these goals carne in June 1881, when at the
request of Guatemala-a Central American, not a South American state-Secretary of State
Blaine offered his country's good offices for arbitration in a boundary dispute between
Guatemala and Mexico. The result was detrimental to U.S. objectives because Mexico,
believing that the U.S. had sided with Guatemala , refused Blaine's offer. This caused the failure
ofhis peacekeeping attempt and the temporary distancing ofU.S.-Mexican trade relations.16
During the War ofthe Pacific (1879-1884) between Chile on one side, and Peru and
Bolivia on the other, Secretary of State Blaine had his second opportunity to advance his peace
policy. The immediate cause ofthis war was Chilean expansion into an area rich in guano and
nitrates . Alarmed by Chile's action, Bolivia and Peru signed a secret treaty of alliance against
Chile. Therefore, when Bolivia declared war on Chile in 1879, because the latter refused to pay
14. In fact one U.S. historian admits that "the Monroe Doctrine was a dead letter from its
promulgation to the end of the nineteenth century, for the United States during that period had
developed neither the naval power nor the diplomatic influence to enforce such a presumptuous
admonition ... [i]t was not until the decade of the 1890s that the United States, having becorne
an industrial power ofthe first rank and consolidated political control ofthe territory on its own
continent, acquired the economic and military capabil ity to project its power to the southem
half of its hemisphere." Keylor, William R. The Twentieth -Century World: An lnternational
History. New York: Oxford University Press , 1984. For citation see page 22, and for an
extended analysis see pages 20-27.
15. DeConde, Alexander . A History 01American Foreign Policy , Vol. 1, 3rd ed. New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1978. 268.
16. For more details on this episode, see DeConde, A History 01American Foreign Policy , Vol.
1, 3rd ed. 268-269.
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a heavy tax on exported nitrates from Bolivian territory, Peru immediately honored its treaty
obligations with Bolivia and joined the war against Chile the same year. l ?
By the time Blaine took office in March 1881, Chile had defeated Bolivia and
controlled most of the Peruvian territory, including its besieged capital, Lima. Concerned with
the precarious balance of power in South America, and the prospect of a more generalized war
in the region, Secretary of State Blaine took an active role in attempting to end the one-sided
war. His position was specified in a stern note that he sent to the Chilean government through
the U.S. minister to Chile, William H. Trescot. Secretary Blaine stated that:
We cannot regard with unconcern the destruction of Peruvian nationality. If our good
offices are rejected, and this policy of the absorption of an independent state be
persisted in, this government will consider itself discharged from any further obligation
to be inf1uenced in its action by the position which Chile has assumed, and will hold
itself'free to appeal to the other republics 01this continent to join it in an effort to avert
consequences which cannot be conjined to Chile and Peru, but which threaten with
extreme danger the pol itical institutions, the peaceful progress, and the liberal
civilization of all America. 18
Secretary Blaine's peacemaking effort failed for two fundamental reasons. First, since
Chile was steadfastly deterrnined to keep Peru's nitrate deposits as an indemnity for her victory,
there was no latitude for compromise and peaceful settlement. Second, President Garfield's
assassination in July 1881 and Blaine's impromptu departure from the State Department
prevented him from carrying out his publ ic threat to call for a multinational force to stop Chile's
action in Peru. Subsequent to Blaine's departure, Frederick Frelinghuysen became Secretary of
State in the new adm inistration of President Chester A. Arthur. Unfortunately for Peru, the new
Secretary carne with no plans to either unilaterally force Ch ile to acquiesce to U.S . demands, or
to organize any type of hemispheric cooperative effort for the resolution of the War of the
PacificoTherefore, Chile did not accede to a conciliatory peace, and kept all the victor's spoils
at the end of the war.
Notwithstanding Secretary Bla ine 's failure to exert moral pres sure on Chile through
inter-American cooperation, this idea became, almost a decade later, the kernel for launching
the Pan-American movement. In May 1888, Congress passed a resolution asking President
17. For background inforrnation on the War ofthe Pacific, see Barros Arana, Diego. Historia de
la Guerra del Pacífico, 1879-1881. Santiago de Chile: Editorial Andrés Bello, 1979 ; and
Caivano, Tomás. Historia de la Guerra de America Entre Chile, Perú, and Bolivia. Lima , Perú :
Editorial Científica, S.R .L., 1979.
18. Quoted in Karnes, ed. Readings in The Latin American Policy ofthe United States. 129-130.
Emphasis added. Simultaneously, Stephen A. Hurlbut, the new U.S. min ister to Lima , delivered
a similar message to the commander of the Chilean arrny of occupation in Peru. For the text of
th is message, see Burr, Robert N. By Reason or Force: Chile and the Balan ce 01 Power in
South America, 1830-1905, Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1974. 156.
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Grover Cleveland to cal1 a conference of American states. It stated that the purpose of this
conference was to promote uniform trade regulations, free trade, and regional peace. The
culmination of this request was the First International Conference of American States held in
Washington, D.C. from October 2, 1889 to April 19, 1890.19
The significance of the First Inter-American Conference is that it gave institutional
form to U.S. policy interest on the issue of intraregional interstate conflict and war in the
Americas. In this gathering the U.S. made explicit its desire to pursue the peaceful resolution of
interstate conflict and war through arbitration, and diplomatic negotiations.z° No al1usionwas
ever made to the possibility of a unilateral military or coercive effort on the part of the United
States to either deter or resolve disputes. This demonstrates and reaffirms a long-term practice
by the U.S. to remain impartial and to favor diplomatic means in either the prevention or
resolution of intraregional interstate conflicts and wars in South America.
From the closing ofthe First Inter-Arnerican Conference in Washington in 1890 to the
introduction by President Franklin D. Roosevelt of the Good Neighbor Policy on March 4,
1933, U.S. policy toward Latin America followed a somewhat dichotomous or even, perhaps,
schizophrenic approach. On the one hand, the United States intervened repeatedly in the
internal affairs of sorne of the Caribbean and Central American states. Based on the
presumption that U.S. national security demanded control of areas that other great powers might
utilize as footholds in the Western Hemisphere, the administrations of Presidents Theodore
Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, and Woodrow Wilson instituted gradually a system of
"protectorates" in the Caribbean basin and Central America. Between 1901 and 1933, Cuba,
Panama, Mexico, Nicaragua, Honduras, Haiti , and the Dominican Republic experienced
recurrent U.S. military interventions and political control.21
While the U.S. was engaged in an imperialistic and interventionist policy in the
Caribbean basin and Central America, it continued to pursue , on the other hand, a diploma tic
approach to the peaceful settlement of interstate disputes in South America. It condemned
routinely the use of force by Latin American states . And as Bryce Wood, a scholar on inter-
American affairs , explains : "The United States rarely undertook to enforce peace between states
19. For background reading on the planning and organization ofthe First Inter-American
Conference, see Samuel Guy Inman, Inter-American Conferences, 1826-1954: History and
Problems. Washington, D.C.: The University Press , 1965. 33-40 and 45-46 ; Jack Child, "The
1889-1890 Washington Conference Through Cuban Eyes: José Martí and the First International
American Conference," 1nter-American Review ofBibliography, Vol. 29 No. 4, 1989.443-456;
and Alexander DeConde, A History ofAmerican Foreign Policy, Vol. 1, 3rd ed. 269-271.
20. Evidentiy , the United States position was built into the section on arbitration ofthe final
report ofthe First Inter-American Conference. Forthe full text ofthe arbitration agreement, see
Conferencia Internacional Americana , Dictámenes de las Comisiones Permanentes y Debates a
que Dieron Lugar, Tomo 11. Washington , D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1890.995-1201.
21. For more inforrnation on U.S. policy of intervention in the Caribbean and Central American
states during this period, see Gil, Latin Am erican-United States Relations. 87-119 ; and
DeConde, A History ofAmerican Foreign Policy, Vol. 1,3rd ed. 338-349, and 379-393.
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in the Americas, but it did feel a deep sense of responsibility to assist mora lly, ceremonially ,
and institutionally in the maintenance of peace. ,,22
No other issue in ínter-American affairs demonstrates more accura tely the sharp
contrast in U.S . interest and policy toward Middle and South America than its media ting role in
intraregional inte rstate confl iets . Three di fferent cases prior to 1935 illustrate clearly the U.S.
position and level of commitment to the mainten ance of interstate peace in these two separate
regions. First, in 1921 an acrimonious boundary dispute between Panama and Costa Rica made
war appear imminent. Although this conflict was settled when Panama yielded to a decision
arbitrated by the Uni ted States , it was only after the latter dispatched to the area a battleship,
four hundred marines, and an ultimatum that it would not tolerate a resumption of the clas hes
that had been taking place along the border.23
Contrast ing sharply with such an assertive and bullying position in the Panamenian-
Costa Rican case, a more congenial and conciliatory United States worked arduously toward the
peaceful resolution of two different crises taking place concurrently in South America. First , the
U~S . tried to mediate the 1928 Paraguayan-Bolivian dispute over the Chaco Boreal territory,
whic h eventually evolved into the 1932-35 Chaco War. 24 Second, the Letíc ia dispute ,
simmering since 1922, broke into fighting in August 31, 1932 , when three. hundred armed
Peruvian civilians took control of the hamlet of Letícia in Colombian territory?5 In both cases,
the Unite d States demonstrated clearly an absolute and relentless commitment to the peaceful
prevention and resolution of these crises. At no time during the long neg otiating process,
however, did the United States try to compel the belligerents toward a nego tiated sett lement,
utilizing intimi dation, coercion, or any other form of punitive and/or forceful military action
against them?6 Clearly, the U.S. wanted interstate peace in South Americ a, but it was not
22. Wood, Bryce. The United States and Lat in American Wars. 1932-1942. Columbia
Universi ty Press, 1966 .2.
23. For a more thorough discussion of this epi sode , see Gil , Latin American-United Stat es
Relations.1 31- 133.
24. Fo r an analysis ofcauses and evolution of the Chaco War by a U.S. sc holar, see Zook ,
David H. The Conduct 01 the Chaco War. New Haven : Bookman Associates, 1960 . For a
Bolivian analysis, see Ayala Moreira, Rogel io. Por Qué no Ganamos la Guerra del Chaco . La
Paz: Talleres Gráficos Bolivianos, 1959. For a Paraguayan view, see Macias, Silvio. La Guerra
de Chaco. Asunción: Ediciones La Trib una, 1942.
25. For a background on the Letíc ia incident, see L ópez, Nicolás F. Estudios Internacionales
Sobre el Conflicto Colomb o-Peruano. Qu ito: Talleres Gráficos Naciona les, 1934 ; Lozano y
Lozano , Fabio. El Punto de Vista Colombian o en la Cuestión de Leticia. Méx ico, D.F.: A.
Mijares y Hermanos, 1933 ; and Ulloa, Alberto. Posición Int ernacional del Perú. Lim a:
Imprentas Torres Aguirre, 1941. For a descriptive aeco unt of the d ispu te an d its rive rine
clashes, see Scheina, Robert L. Latin America : A Nava l His tory, 1810-1 987. An napolis,
Maryland: Naval lnstitute Press, 1987. 121-1 22.
26. My conclusion on the role played by the United State s in, both, the Chaco and Leticia
eonflicts are based on my reading of the detai led historical acco unt presented by diplomatic
historian of inter-Arner ican a ffairs, Bry ce Wood. Refer ring to the South American crises
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prepared to enforce it. In fact , reflecting on the U.S. course of action or attitude regarding these
two territorial disputes in the 1930's , Secretary of State Cordell Hull writes in his memoirs that
after extensive consultations with President Roosevelt, the decision was made to cooperate
with, and acquiesce in the assumption of jurisdiction by the League of Nations Advisory
Committee handling these disputes in the heart of the Western Hemisphere. He elaborates
further that :
Our acceptance signified our willingness to cooperate with other nations in the
settlement of Latin American questions. Unilateral action on our part was now in the
discard. We began to apply a principie to which we adhered in the years to follow.
Th is was to refrain from acting until after having consulted with all the other interested
nations. Only in this way could we work from under the deep-seated resentment
engendered in Latin America by previous one-sided actions of our country.Í "
Both, the Chaco and Let íc ia crises demonstrate that in spite of U.S. resolute
commitment to the peaceful settlement of these disputes, they evolved contrary to the publicly
expressed objectives and interests of the United States in the region. While the Letícia conflict
was contained to few casualties and small scale fighting between Colombia and Pero, the Chaco
dispute evolved into the first major and deadliest South American interstate war in the twentieth
century?Bln this sense, one can infer from these outcomes that, at least prior to 1935, the power
and diplomatic leadership of the United States in South America could neither deter hostile
neighbors from fighting, nor lead them toward a peaceful resolution of their militarized
conflicts?9
between 1928 and 1942, Wood maintains that " ... the government ofthe United States did not
find it possible to take the lead in the adoption of measures finn enough to prevent warfare in
South America. The burdens that would have been shouldered had the United States undertaken
to prevent fighting by the use of force or other effective means might have been onerous indeed.
In addition, the initiation of such act ion by the United States would not have been in keeping
with the non interventionist principies that the United States government strove mightingly to
keep inviolate in other aspects ofthe good neighbor policy." For this citation, see Wood, The
United States and Latin American Wars, 1932-1942. 14.
27. Hull , Cordel!. The Memoirs ofCordell Hull , Vo!. I. New York: The Macmillan Company,
1948. 310-311.
28. The casualty count during the Letícia dispute is put at 50, all occurring in the Battle of
Tarapacá. The estimate for the Chaco War is well over 52,000 Bolivian deaths and 36,000
Paraguayan soldiers. See Micheal Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical
Reference. Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 1992.700 and
703.
29. In fact, Bryce Wood, discussing the diplomatic failure at the Montevideo Conference to
secure peace and end the Chaco War , affinns that: "Finally, when the Paraguayan arrny could
advance no more, nor the Bol ivian anny counterattack, the two governments accepted an
annistice proposed by five American states in June 1935." Wood, The United States and Latin
American Wars, 1932-1942.62.
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When the Chaco War ended in 1935, the Roosevelt administration was concemed
principally with the growth and diffusion of Fascist regimes in Europe and their increased
activities in Latin America. Consequently, in an effort to partly counteract these developments
in the late 1930's, the United States assembled a cooperative hemispheric security system.
Besides aiming to styrnie the spread ofFascist-European influence to the Westem Hemisphere,
the U.S. sought to establish, consistent with its national interests, an institutional mechanism to
settle intraregional interstate conflicts and to provide mutual security for its members.
The inter-American security system that emerged in the late 1930's, and that was later
strengthened during and after World War Il, was in part an extension of the First Intemational
Conference of American States held in Washington , D.C. in 1889-1890. In this gathering, as in
subsequent Intemational Conferences of American States and Special Conferences , the United
States continued to reiterate its absolute commitrnent to the peaceful settlement of intraregional
. d' . h . 30interstate isputes m t e Amencas.
Ultimately, the Rio de Janeiro Special Conference of 1947 produced the Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. To the extent that this treaty reflects the position
and diplomatic leadership of the United States in the post-World War period, it is an
unequivocal and direct statement, delineating and revealing U.S. interest and policy on the issue
of interstate disputes in the Americas. The Rio Treaty stipulates elearly in Artiele 2 ~at:
[T]he High Contracting Parties undertake to submit every controversy which may arise
between them to methods of peaceful settlement and to endeavor to settle any such
controversy among themselves by means of the procedures in force in the Inter-
American System before referring it to the General Assembly or the Security Counc il
ofthe United Nations.31
Furthermore, Artiele 3 introduces the concept of collective security into the inter-
American system. It specifies that:
[A]n armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an
attack against all the American States and, consequently, each of the said Contracting
Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense ...32
30. Background information on the evolution ofthe inter-American system and the role ofthe
United States in it may be found in Atkins, Latin America in the lnternational Political System,
2nd ed. 202-236; and John D. Martz and Lars Schoultz , ed. Latin America, the United States,
and the Inter-American System.
31. Bartlett, ed. The Record 01American Diplomacy: Documents and Readings in the History 01
American Foreign Relations, 3rd ed. 730. For a full text ofthe 1947 Rio Treaty, see 730-733.
32. Bartlett, ed. The Record 01American Diplomacy: Documents and Readings in the History 01
American Foreign Relations, 3rd ed. 730-731.
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In sum, the Rio Treaty not only embodies the publicly-stated interests and goals of the
United States in Latin America but, more importantly, since the end of the Second World War
to the present, it has served as the main legal institutional framework to deal with the prevention
and/or resolution of interstate conflicts in the Americas.
The purpose of the previous discussion has been to identify the national interest and
political position of the United States in South America with respect to intraregional interstate
peace. Based on this analysis, it has been demonstrated empirical1y that the U.S. has been ful1y
committed to the promotion and maintenance of interstate peace in this region. Moreover, it has
been shown that the U.S. has been determined to serve as a diplomatic catalyst in the prevention
and resolution of interstate disputes in the Americas . First, it has been instrumental in
organizing institutional mechanisms for the promotion and maintenance of interstate peace.
And, second, whenever it has been confronted with a militarized conflict in South America
prior to 1935, it has decidedly favored diplomatic avenues over military options as the policy
choice to either prevent or resolve a crisis . Given its evident power and demonstrated interest in
preventing the outbreak of war in the Americas prior to 1935, is the peace in South America a
direct consequence of U.S. hegemonic behavior in the region? I tum my attention in the
following section to an analysis of this important question.
3. POWER, INTEREST AND BEHAVIOR: A RECIPE FOR INTERSTATE PEA CE?
While the end of the Chaco War ushered in a long period of interstate peace in South
America, the region has not been immune from recurrent territorial disputes and militarized
crises. There have been several South American dyads involving conflicting claims. These are
the Ecuadorian-Peruvian dispute over territ ory in the Amazon; the Argentine-Chilean quarrel
over the islands in the Beagle Channel; the Colombian-Venezuelan controversy over the Gulf of
Venezuela; and the dispute over the Essequibo territory between Venezuela and Guyana.
That these disputes have not evolved into major intraregional interstate wars in the last
sixty years is more significant than their lingering effect. Many analysts attribute this happy and
unexpected development to the pacifying influence exerted by the United States in South
America since 1935. Therefore, I will examine the role played by this country in the most
critical moments of crisis and maintenance of interstate peace in the region .
In the course of this investigation I will present, first , a general background to each
crisis . The aim is to outline the origin of the dispute, the stake in question, and the claims of the
disputants. Second, I will describe and analyze the position of the United States toward the
situation and its effort to prevent war. Th ird, I will explain either the final outcome, or present
status ofthe controversy in question. Finally, I will present my conclusion as to whether or not
the position of the U.S. pre vailed and influenced the final outcome of the crisis. In sum, by
concentrating on the militarized crises and diplomatic standoffs that have occurred since 1935, I
intend to uncover if indeed U.S. hegemonic power has been instrumental in preserving peace
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and stability in South America in the post-Chaco-War periodo
4. THREE MILITARlZED CRlSES IN ECUADORlAN-PERUVIAN RELATIONS
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The Ecuadorian-Peruvian territorial dispute is the most enduring and virulent
controversy in South America since 1935. These two countries began to haggle over the limits
of their territory as early as 1830, when Ecuador became an independent state separate from
Colombia. The stakes of this quarrel have involved a small area in the Pacific Ocean and sorne
120,000 square miles of territory east of the Andes and between the Equator and the Marañón
R· 33 S' . . d d E d h . d b . . 34 H .rver, mee ItS m epen ence, cua or as stnve to e an Amazoman nation, ence, 115
national objective has been to gain access and control over parts of the Amazon jungle and the
river system draining this area. On the other hand, Peru's aim has been to prevent Ecuador from
expanding its territory eastward, particularly in the aftermath of its defeat in the 1932 Letícia
Dispute with Colombia.
Three times in the last sixty years, Ecuador and Peru have been at the brink of a major
war over the disputed territory in the Amazon. First, on July 5, 1941 hostilities broke out when
an Ecuadorian army patrol encountered a group of Peruvian agricultural workers and civil
guards near the Zarumilla River, inside Ecuador's borders. While in Quito it was reported that
the Peruvians opened fire against the patrol ; in Lima, the foreign ministry issued a statement
explaining that Ecuadorian soldiers had attacked Peruvian positions and had been defeated.35
In the 1941 Marañón Conflict , Ecuador and Peru engaged in sporadic, but sometimes
heavy and fierce fighting along their boundaries. Before these two countries finally negotiated
the Talara troce on October 2, 1941, they had mobilized together close to 18,000 troops, and
33. For detailed background to the Ecuadorian-Peruvian territorial dispute, see John B. Allcock,
et. al., 3rd ed., Border and Territorial Disputes. London, England: Longman Group UK
Limited, 1992. 586-591; Gordon lreland, Boundaries, Possessions. and Conjlicts in South
America. New York: Octagon Books , 1938 (1971) . 219-230; Zook, David H. Zarumilla-
Marañón: The Ecuador-Peru Dispute. New York: Bookman Associates, 1964; Wood, The
United States and Latín American Wars. 1932-1942; Maier, Georg. " Ecuadorian-Peruvian
Boundary Dispute ," American Journal 01 International Law, Vol. 63 (January 1969). 28-46;
Carlos Palacios Saena, La Guerra del 41: El Protocolo de Río no Demarcó Fronteras
Definitivas. Guayaquil: Ediciones Ara, 1979; Bolívar López, Hermán. El Ecuador y su
Problema Territorial con el Perú. Quito: Biblioteca Militar Ecuatoriana, 1978; Monteza Tafur,
Miguel. El Conflicto Militar del Perú con el Ecuador. Lima : Editorial Arica , 1976; and
Valencia Rodríguez, Luis. "Antecedentes Históricos del Problema Limitrofe ," in Lasso, Xavier
and Edmundo Guerra, eds. Ecuador y Perú: Futuro de Paz? Quito: Ed. La Bunga, 1993. 11-17.
34. Ricardo Muñoz Chávez, "El Derecho Amazónico Es Irrenunciable," in Lasso and Guerra,
eds. Ecuador y Perú: Futuro de Paz? 95-10 l.
35. For the Ecuadorian account of events, see Donoso Tobar, Julio. La Invasión Peruana y el
Protocolo de Río. Quito: Ediciones Ecuatorianas, 1945. 174-175 . The Peruvian version is
reported by Wood, The United States and Latin American Wars. 1932-1942.278.
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had sustained enonnous material losses and over 600 combat casuaIties.36 At the end, the c1ear
military victor was Pero who not only prevented Ecuadorian expansion in the Amazon, but,
more importantly, had military control over the province of El Oro in Ecuador and was
threatening to overtake Guayaquil.
After considerable diplomatic maneuvering by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United
States, the Talara truce between Ecuador and Peru led to the signing of The Protocol of Rio de
Janeiro on January 29, 1942. The acceptance of this convention by both parties effectively
ended organized fighting along the Ecuadorian-Peruvian border in the 1940's. This treaty
specified the boundary line by naming certain points along the border. Moreover, it stipulated
that Peru would withdraw its troops from Ecuadorian territory. It granted to Ecuador freedom of
navigation on rivers controlled by Peru, and designated Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United
37States as guarantors.
The Marañón conflict did not just happen in a political and historical vacuum. On the
contrary, it was the culmination of a long, arduous, and tense diplomatic process that began on
August 1, 1887, when the foreign ministers of Ecuador and Pero signed an arbitration accord.
At the time, they agreed to submit the territorial question to the decision of the King of Spain.
Pending direct bilateral negotiations between Ecuador and Pero, the decision was delayed for
over twenty years. In addition, the original decision to enlist the King of Spain as arbitrator was
quite whimsical : in 1887, Alfonso XIII, the son of the late king Alfonso XII, had not yet
celebrated his first birthday. Final mediation had to be delayed 20 years to allow the King to
reach his majority. Finally, in 1910 King Alfonso XIII of Spain declined to hand down a
verdict, because a partial and prernature disclosure of unfavorable terrns of the award for
Ecuador created a public outcry in that country.38
Mutual recriminations in Quito and Lima led to a general military mobilization in both
countries. The war scare of 1910 ceased under strong diplomatic pressure from Argentina,
Brazil, and the United States . The three countries offered to act as mediators between Ecuador
36. For the factual inforrnation on the military campaign, the diplomatic negotiations between
Ecuador and Peru, and the position of the United Sates in regard to the Marañón Conflict, I rely
on Wood, The United Sta tes and Latin American Wars, 1932-1942. 255-344; for the specific
casuaIty count of this conflict, see Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conjlicts: A Statistical
Reference . 705. He reports that Peru lost 80 to lOO soldiers in battle and Ecuador 500 to 600. As
specified in chapter one in this work, this conflict does not c1assify as a major war because it
falls short of the one-thausand-fatalities count that I utilized throughout this study as the basic
criterion to identify major wars from other militarized crises in the region. For more
inforrnation on this point, see in this work chapter one. 20 fn 5.
37. For the text of the Rio de Janeiro Protocol, see Leland M. Goodrich, ed . Documents on
American Foreign Relations, 1941-1942, Vol. IV, July 1941-June 1942. Boston: World Peace
Foundation, 1942. 433-435 ; and in U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, Vol. VI, February
28,1942. 195-196.
38. Allcock, el. al., 3rd ed. , Border and Territorial Disputes. 586-591; and Ireland, Boundaries,
Possessions, and Conjlicts in South America. 221-226.
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and Peru and declared that it was "unthinkable that Ecuador and Peru should :ro to war over a
boundary dispute which both, by solemn agreement, submitted to arbitration.,,3
As a mediator, rather than as an enforcer of interstate peace , is how the United States
first got involved in the territorial di spute between Ecuador and Peru. Since its initi al
involvement, the U.S. demonstrated a marked commitment to the peaceful settlement of that
conflict. This was particularly evident in 1910, when the U.S. representative in Quito was
instructed to convey to the President of Ecuador that the failure of his country to be
"conciliatory" would be regarded by the United States as an indication of "a disinclination to
reach a peaceful and honorable solution ofthe boundary difficulty...,,40
The impartial and mediating attitude of the United States, and its commitment to a
peaceful settlement of the Ecuadorian-Peruvian dispute is revealed further in a cogent exchange
of lellers between the President of Ecuador, Federico Páez, and President Franklin D.
Roosevelt. On May 7, 1936, President Páez wrote to President Roosevelt requesting him to
pressure Peru to accede to move the Ecuadorian-Peruvian Peace Conference from Lima to
Washington. This petition was accompanied by an outline of events in the negotiations between
the two countries in Lima, and by tet another reference to Ecuador's inevitable recourse "to
defend by arrns her vital interests.,,4 To this request, President Roosevelt responded:
But I feel confident that Your Excellency will recognize that the arbitrator of an
international dispute, ifhe is to carry out his high duties with the complete impartiality
which his position demands, must refrain from taking any action which would appe ar
to imply the bringing of any pressure, even in the forrn of moral influence, upon either
of the parties to the dispute. If ... 1 were now to take any action, even action in the
nature of a friendly and informal request, which might be construed by the
Government of Peru as be ing beyond the limits of complete judicial impartiality, the
confidence ofthe Peruvian Govemment in the arbitrator might be shaken ...42
With this statement, President Roosevelt made very c1ear to a11 South American states
that the new policy of the United States regarding intraregional relations was to participate as
just another state among equals, and thatthe U.S. was not dispo sed to exert unilateral pressure
on any one party in a dispute in the region.43
39. As quoted by Wood , The United States and Latin American Wars. 1932-1942 .256.
40. Wood, The United States and Latin American Wars. 1932-1942.257.
41. Foreign Relations ofthe United States, Diplomat ic Papers 1936. Washington, D .e. : U .S.
Govemment Printing Office, 1954 . Vol. V. 110.
42. Emphasis added. Foreign Relations ofthe United States. Diplomat ic Papers 1936 , Vol. V.
113.
43 . To emphasize this polic y and make it c1ear to the Ecuadorians, Assistant Secretary of State
Sumner Welles sent a memorandum 10 the Chief of the Division of Latin American Affair s in
the U.S. Department of State , Laurence Duggan, instructing him to expl ain to the Government
of Ecuador the functions of the U.S. in the negotiat ions leadin g up to the 1936 Ecuado rian-
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From the war scare of 1910 to the 1936 Washington conference between the
delegat ions of Ecu ador and Peru , the bilateral relations of these two states were plagued by,
both, mult iple mil itarized border incidents, and failed diplomatic initi atives intended to solve
the terri torial dispute. In this sense, the 1936 Washington conference proved to be no different
from other diplomatic effort s. It was broken off in 1938 without having achieved any type of
. d l 44negona te sett ement.
Notwithstanding its immediate failure , the 1936-1938 Ecuadorian-Peruvian conference
in Washington, D.C. is an important element in identifying and explaining the role of the
United States government toward the territorial dispute in the Amazon. In the course of these
negot iations , U.S. diplomats adhered to a position of impartiality and refused to take the lead in
matters such as the suggestion of a compromise boundary line. 45 Illustrative of this position is
the reaction of Under Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, to the possibility of Ecuador resorting
to force in June 1937 in an attempt to settle the territorial dispute. Overtly concerned with
Ecuador's posture, Welles asked the Ambassador from Ecuador, Colón Eloy Alfaro :
[I]f he would not consider it peculiarly deplorable at th is very moment, when the
prospects seemed brighter than they have for sorne months past , for his Government to
consider breaking off negotiations or even to contemplate hostilities.... how would it
be poss ible for the Government of Ecuador, after the peace treat ies which it had signed
at the Buenos Aires Conference and in view of the unanimous desire on the part of all
of the American Republics there expressed always to resort to peaceful means of
adjudicating disputes, now tocontemplate hostilities when no act of aggression had
been committed against Ecuador by Peru .46
Peruvian Conference in Wash ington . In this memorandum, Assistant Secretary Welles , explains
that the role of the U.S. government: "is merely that of a friendly and conciliatory host and that
we have no intention of being represented during the course of the preliminary negotiations
between the two delegations." Foreign Relations ofthe United States, Diplomatic Papers 1936,
Vol. V.119.
44 . Bryce Wood, Aggressi on and History : The Case of Ecuador and Peru. Aun Amor :
Unive rsity Microfilms International , 1978. 5, and 55-59. This conference was carried out on the
basis of an agreement signed by Ecuador and Peru in Lima on July 6, 1936. This document
specifi ed that both co unt ries should respect and maintain a status quo line in the disputed
territo ry unt il a final arbitra l deci sion could be reached in the con ference . For the text of this
document, see Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1936, Vol. V. 116-
117.
45. For details of the negotiations and factual information regarding the role of the United Sates
in them, see Foreign Relations of the United States , Diplomatic Papers 193 7. Wash ington,
D.c.: U.S. Government Print ing Office , 1954, Vol. V (1937 ). 46-56; Ibid., Vol. V (193 8). 217-
245; and 1bid. , Vol. V ( 1939) . 14 1- 147.
46 . For a memorandum ofthe entire co nversation on June 10, 1937, se e Foreign Relations of
the United States. Diplomatic Papers 1937.49-52 ; and for this spec ific citation, see 50-51.
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Ecuador did not resort to war at the time. Instead, it responded by proposing arbitration
of the whole controversy by the President of the United Sates. This proposal was accompanied
by an outline of Ecuador's position as to the boundary line itself and by, yet, another reference
to war appearing to be "our only recourse.,,47
The role played by the United States and how it perceived itself in the Ecuadorian-
Peruvian Conference of 1936 in Washington, O.e. is illustrated further by the reply of Under
Secretary Welles to Ecuador's proposal of August 26,1937. He responded that:
[W]hile this Government was acting as host to the two delegations, it did not possess
the functions of mediator nor of intermediary and that , while I was prepared and had
been prepared to do everything I could to facilitate the successful termination of the
negotiations, I did not feel authorized by either of the two Governments involved to
suggest specific solutions or methods of procedure.48
The collapse of the Ecuadorian-Peruvian Conference in Washington, O.e. on
September 29, 1938 effectively ended for more than two years any sustained effort by third
parties to settle the dispute. Only in Oecember 1938, during the eighth conference of American
states in Lima, Peru, several unofficial attempts were made to resolve the controversy.49 In this
gathering, Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, discussed with Peru's Foreign Minister, Carlos
Concha, his concern with the Ecuadorian-Peruvian situation. In his report of his conversation
with Concha to Under Secretary Welles, Secretary of State Hull writes:
I told him that the world situation requires that the peace of the Americas be
maintained; that the public sentiment in the Americas is unanimous in its insistence
that there be peace on this hemisphere; that the Ecuador-Pero boundary dispute is the
only major blight on the peace of the Americas; that because of its resources, strength
and experience Peru should take the initiative although Ecuador of course should do
its ful! part ; and after complimenting Or. Concha for his handling of the Conference,
appealed to him to take upon his shoulders the responsibility for removing the last
major obstacle towards peace in the Americas. Or. Concha has assured me that the
President [Manuel Prado Ugarteche] is genuinely desirous of a settlement of the
dispute and I believe that Or. Concha was impressed by my personal appeal to him to
take the initiative and endeavor to find a solution.... Under the circumstances, I
believe I have done al! that I possibly can .50
47. Foreign Relations ofthe United States, Diplomatic Papers 1937. 55.
48. For memorandum of this exchange on January 28 , 1938, see Foreign Relations of the
United States, Diplomatic Papers 1938, Vol. V. 217-218.
49. Wood, Aggression and History: The Case ofEcuador and Peru. 266.
50. Telegram 74, from Lima, Pero, Oecember 27, 1938. Foreign Relations ofthe United States,
Diplomatic Papers 1938. 244.
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Again, this exchange with Concha is indicative of U.S. circumspection, limitations,
andlor inability to act as an authoritative enforcer of interstate peace in South America. This is
particularly evident when the U.S. Secretary of State confides to one of his Under Secretaries
that he has done all he can , omitting all references to any sort of coercive or authoritative action
by the United States , to settle the dispute between Ecuador and Peru. In faet, Secretary of State
Hull malees no mention in his memoirs ofthe territorial dispute between Ecuador and Peru.51
The role of the United States in the Ecuadorian-Peruvian dispute is revealed in two
other instances. First, in receipt of a tep id acceptance message from Peru to a mediation
proposal made by Argentina, Brazil, and the U.S., Secretary of State Cordell Hull , showing
reticence to apply pressure on the disputants, suggested to the other mediators that the course of
action should be to consider the messages of acceptance from Peru and Ecuador as
"satisfactory." He "feared" that if any attempt was made by the three governments to elicit a
more favorable response from Peru , the latter would elaim that "pressure was being exercised
upon it which was not consonant with its national sovereignty and dignity ...,,52
Second, reacting candidly to an effort made by Oswaldo Aranha, the Brazilian
Min ister for Foreign Affairs, to inelude Chile as a mediator and future guarantor of the
Ecuador-Peru peace accord, Secretary Hull confided to the U.S. Ambassador in Lima that:
For your personal information you are informed that this Government had no prior
knowledge of the renewed initiative with regard to the inelusion of Chile until it was
informed that Foreign Minister Aranha in the course ofhis visit to Santiago had agreed
with the Chilean Foreign Minister with regard thereto and had thereafter agreed with
the Foreign Minister of Argentina as to the desirability of this step.53
Such an uneventful episode, nevertheless, demonstrates on the part of the U.S. a
marked degree of apathy and lack of information regarding the thrust of diplomatic
maneuvering in the aftermath of the outbreak of hostilities between Ecuador and Peru in July
1941.
The evidence presented aboye indicates, on the one hand, that the United States was
publiely committed to help bring about a peaceful settlement between Ecuador and Peru . But,
on the other hand , the record diseloses that in the years prior to the 1941 Marañón crisis, the
U.S . was either unable, or unwilling to force or lead towards an unilateral territorial
arrangement in South America. It was not only Under Secretary Welles's statements of
impartiality and refusal to impose or dictate a unilateral settlement on Ecuador and Peru. More
importantly, it was President Roosevelt's refusal to exert any type ofpressure on both disputant,
51. Hull , The Memoirs 01Cordell Hull . 601-611. See particularly his chapter discussing the
focal points ofthe Pan American Conference in Lima , Peru, on Oecember 9, 1938.
52. Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers 1941 . Washington, O.e.: U.S.
Government Printing Office , 1941. 226.
53. ltalics are mine . Foreign Relations ofthe United States. Diplomatic Papers 1941. 244.
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and Secretary of State Hull's candid admission that he had done aH he could to convince Peru to
take the diplomatic initiative towards a peaceful solution ofthe controversy.
Perhaps the United States concem with the expanding war in Europe, and the spirit of
the Good Neighbor policy towards Latin America made this country quite cautious and
reluctant to apply such force on these two South American disputants as would lead them
toward a resolution of their controversy. In the final analysis, all the peace conferences,
negotiations, and diplomatic efforts organized by the U.S. in conjunction with several other
South American countries did not prevent the outbreak of a militarized crisis between Ecuador
and Peru in July 1941. I conclude, accordingly, that in this particular instance the United States
failed to prevent the outbreak of hostilities and promote a peaceful and long-Iasting settlement
in South America.
Due to Ecuador's military weakness in the 1941 Marañón conflict, to the United States
concem with the war in Europe, and to the haste of the other South American states to close a
violent chapter in the Ecuador-Peru territorial dispute , Ecuador was effectively compelled to
accept and sign the 1942 Protocol of Rio de Janeiro, a treaty that essentially shattered Ecuador's
sovereign objective to be an Amazonian nation.
Never satisfied with the Rio Protocol and claiming that it had signed the treaty under
dures s, Ecuador invoked the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the 1947 Rio
Treaty) in 1955, arguing that Peru was preparing to invade again . At this juncture, the
Organization of American States organized a peace-observing team of military attachés
stationed in Lima. To Ecuador's dismay , the military observers found no evidence of Peruvian
military preparation for a possible invasion of Ecuador. Despite the set back, Ecuador was able
to keep alive in the 1950's the territorial dispute with Peru due to certain legal, cartographic, and
geographic technicalities. Finally, in 1960 Ecuador formally declared the 1942 Rio de Janeiro
Protocol null and void. Such unilateral action was immediately rejected by Peru who claimed
that the territorial dispute with Ecuador had been settled permanently at the 1942 Rio de Janeiro
Conference. 54
As a continuation of their territorial dispute in the Amazon jungle, Ecuador and Peru
clashed militarily for a second time on January 28, 1981. This time the area involved was a
poorly demarcated 48-mile stretch along the Cóndor Mountains , believed to be rich in gold and
oi!. In 1942, when the Rio Protocol specified the border between the two states, the
cartographers were unaware ofthe existence ofthe Cenepa River.55 Since the discovery ofthis
river, Ecuador has claimedjurisdiction over 130 square miles west ofthe Cenepa watershed.
54. For this sequence of events I draw on the historical account in Jack Child, Geopolitics and
Conflict in South America : Quarrels Among Neighbors . New York: Praeger Publishers , 1985.
92-98.
55. The Cenepa river was discovered in 1947 by a U.S. aerial cartograph ic expedition . For more
details, see Jorge Pérez Concha, "Tesis de Nulidad e Inejecutib ilidad: El Arbitraje Papal" in
Lasso and Guerra, eds. Ecuador y Pero: Futuro de Paz? 20.
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The immediate source ofthe 1981 militarized crisis was Peru's claim that Ecuador had
occupied three abandoned Peruvian military outposts in the Cóndor Mountains . Consequently,
Peru launched a surprise attack against Ecuadorian forces a11egedly stationed there. 56 Before
Ecuador and Peru accepted on February 2, 1981 cease-fire appeals from Pope John Paul n, the
United Sates , and other Latin American states , including the three other 1942 Rio Treaty
guarantors , both nations sustained heavy material looses and sorne combat casualties.I " In
addition, the newly instituted democratic governments in both countries were seriously shaken
from the effects ofthe economic and political disruptions brought about by the short, but costly,
military campaign.
The fact that the 198I militarized crisis lasted only five days, and that it was prevented
from escalating further is the resuIt of the quick and decisive action of Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
and the United States . On January 29, 1981 the Permanent Council of the Organization of
American States convened in Washington, D.C. and urged Ecuador and Peru to accept the
creation of a cornmission to investigate the border clashes. Ecuador agreed immediately to this
proposal but Peru rejected it, arguing that only the Rio Protocol guarantors were competent to
mediate the latest crisis .58 On the heels of the O.A.S. mediating failure, the four state
guarantors, together with representatives from Ecuador and Peru , gathered in Brasilia on
January 31 to negotiate a peaceful settlement. After more than twenty hours of discussions, the
two warring parties fina11y agreed to terminate hostilities on February 2, 1981 and to continue
negotiating a peaceful solution to the border dispute.
In the 1981 cris is, as in the previous border clash between Ecuador and Peru, the
official position ofthe United States government was to remain neutral and to urge the warring
parties to negotiate a peaceful solution to their century-old territorial controversy. Despite press
reports indicating that U.S. officia ls were "working behind the scene to help minimize the
56. For a description of the second Ecuadorian-Peruvian crisis in the post-Chaco-War period
and its immediate causes, see The Christian Scie nce Monitor, January 29, 1981. 2; ldem ,
February 2, 1981. 6; The New York Times, January 24, 1981. 2; Idem , January 29, 1981. 8;
Idem, January, 30. 6; Idem, January 31. 6; Idem, February 1, 1981. 3; Idem, February 2, 1981. I
and 7; Idem , February 3, 1981. 3; ldem , Febru ary 8, 1981, Section IV. 4; and Edward
Schumacher, "Behind Ecuador War, Long-Smoldering Resentment," The New York Times,
February 10, 1981 . 2.
57. Casualty counts range from the official figure of both countries which puts the total number
at nine soldiers ki11ed to estimates as high as two hundred killed and wounded . For the official
figure, see Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conjlicts: A Statistical Reference. 1190, and The
New York Times, February 8, 1981, Section IV. 4. For other higher estimates quoted, see Child,
Geopolitics and Conjlict in South America: Quarrels Among Neighbors. 96.
58. See Latin America Weekly Report , Friday, February 6, 1981. 1-2. This is a key obstacle to
the successfu l settlement of the Ecuadorian-Peruvian territorial dispute. Ever since in 1960
Ecuador abrogated the 1942 Rio Protocol unilaterally, it has preferred to bring the territorial
dispute to international organisms like the O.A.S. and the U.N. On the other hand, Peru refuses
the mediation of a11 parties, except that of the four guarantors of the Rio Protocol.
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damage,,,59 I have found no official evidence of a forceful or authoritative effort on the part of
the U.S. government to prevent further military encounters in South America.60 In fact, the
only, perhaps, the boldest U.S. action toward this end carne in February 7, 1977 when the Carter
Administration blocked the sale by Israel to Ecuador of 24 Kfir aircraft. At the time, U.S.
officials maintained that since the General Electric J-79 engines of those airplanes were U.S.-
made, the United Sates government had the right to veto the transaction. In response to the U.S.
action, in November 1977 Ecuador purchased 18 advanced French Mirage F-I aircraft.61
In sum, it appears that in the 1981 Ecuadorian-Peruvian conf1ict the United States had
no greater or lesser role than any ofthe other three Latin American guarantors. Even when the
U.S. has acted to defuse tension between these two countries, as was the case with the blocked
sale of Israeli Kfir combat aircraft to Ecuador in 1977, Ecuador and Peru, as well as other South
American countries have been able to circumvent U.S. restrictions on arms supplies by
procuring weapons from other countries. In this sense, blame for the failure to prevent the
outbreak of hostilities along the Ecuadorian-Peruvian border, or credit for quickly terminating
the military clash in 198I is shared equally by the four 1942 Rio Protocol guarantors .
Albeit its inferior military position relative to that of Peru, Ecuador has remained
adamant about its "sovereign right" to be an Amazonian state. It continues to press the issue on
its right to have access to the Amazon and the river system draining this region . It insists that
the discovery of the Cenepa River, a tributary of the Marañón River, strengthens its claim over
parts ofthe Cóndor Mountains between the Zamora and Santiago rivers.
Since the cease-fire agreement ending the 198I conflict, Ecuador and Peru have been
unable to settle peacefully their territorial dispute. Thus, numerous shooting incidents on the
disputed border between the two nations occurred yearly during the 1980's and early 1990's. In
the midst of this tense and volatile relationship , Peru and Ecuador clashed for the third time in
the post-Chaco War period on January 27, 1995.62 Again, the immediate cause ofthe latest
59. See Edward Schumacher, "Behind Ecuador War, Long-Smoldering Resentment," The New
York Times, Tuesday, February 10,1981. 2.
60. I base my conclusion on a review ofseveral volumes ofthe U.S. Oepartment ofState,
Bulletin covering the months prior, during, and after the January-February 1981 Ecuadorian-
Peruvian crisis. In my search I found no evidence of any public U.S. statement alluding to or
discussing specific steps either to prevent or settle peacefully this or future militarized crises
between Ecuador and Peru. To corroborate, see U.S. Oepartment of State, Bulletin , Washington,
O.e.: U.S. Governrnent Printing Office, 1980 and 1981, Vols. 80 and 81, Nos. 2034 to 2057
(January 1980 to December 1981).
61. Graham Hovey, "U.S. Blocks Sale ofIsraeli Planes to Ecuadorians," The New York Times,
Tuesday, February 8, 1977. I and 4; The New York Times, Saturday, June 4, 1977. 7; The New
York Times, Wednesday, July 6, 1977. I and 15; Bernard Weinraub, "U.S. Again Blocks Israeli
Sale of Jets to Ecuador," The New York Times, Thursday, July 7,1977.4. For a report ofthe
sale to Ecuador of French Dassault-Breguet Mirage F-I planes , see Latin American Political
Report, Vol. XI, No. 6, February 11,1977.47.
62. The New York Times, Saturday, January 28, 1995.2; and El Tiempo, Santa Fe de Bogotá,
Colombia, Saturday, January 28, 1995. 1, 9-10.
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incident was Peru's c1aim that Ecuador had occupied Peruvian territory in the remote Andean
region of the Cóndor Mountains. In response, it launched an attack to dislodge Ecuadorian
soldiers from two border posts within the disputed area. Meanwhile, Ecuador's President, Sixto
Durán Ballén vowed, "Ecuador will not back off from the positions that it maintains in the
border." He added , "if we back down, we are convinced that Peru will continue to invade our
land.,,63
Nationalistic rhetoric from both Peru's President, Alberto Fujimori, and Ecuador's
President, Sixto Durán Ballén, made negotiations very difficult. One, or both sides rejected
several mediating offers. These included that by U.N. General Secretary, Boutros Boutros-
Ghali, one from the non-perrnanent or rotating U.N. Security Council President, Carlos Saúl
Menem of Argentina, another by the General Secretary of the O.A.S., César Gaviria Trujillo of
Colombia, and one by forrner Presidents and Nobel Peace Laureates Osea r Arias Sánchez of
Costa Rica and Jimmy Carter. 64
The January 1995 border skirrnish between Ecuador and Peru proved to be the most
costly militarized crisis in South America since the 1941 Marañón contlict. The human toll
from both sides oscillates between as few as 47 casualties to as many as 300 soldiers killed .65
Several estimates put the cost of the military campaign for each side at ten million dollars per
day.66Despite these heavy loses, the territorial dispute still remains unsettled. And the cease-
fire agreement that went into effect as of 12 noon, on Friday, February 17, 1995 did not deal
with the basic problems that originally caused the latest military contlict between Ecuador and
Peru.67
Based on the material I have been able to review, I do not find evidence indicating that
the United States government played a more significant mediating role than any of the other
three South American guarantors .68 When the first cease-fire attempt failed on Thursday,
63. As quoted in the The New York Times, Sunday, January 29, 1995. 6.
64. The New York Times, Sunday , January 29, 1995.6; La Nación, Buenos Aires, Argentina,
Sunday, January, 29,1995. 1-3; El Tiempo, Santa Fe de Bogotá, Colombia, Saturday, January
28, 1995. 1 and 9; and The New York Times, Sunday, February 12, 1995. 16.
65. For casualty figures, see The New York Times, Sunday, February 12, 1995. 16; and Juan
Jesús Aznárez, "Perú y Ecuador Ponen Fin a Su Guerra Fronteriza," El País Internacional,
Spain, Monday, February 20, 1995. 3. Again, this contlict produced less than one thousand
fatalities and for that reason it is not treated here as a war, as it was called in the U.S. For more
inforrnation on this criterion, see in this work chapter one. 20 fn. 5.
66. The New York Times , Thursday, February 9, 1995. 6; and Luis Salas, "Espíritu de
Combate ," Cambio 16, Spain, No. 1213, February 20,1995.46-47.
67. James Brooke , "Peru and Ecuador Hall Fighting Along Border, Claiming Victory,' The New
York Times, Wednesday, February 15, 1995. 6; and El País Internacional, Spain, Monday,
February 20, 1995. 3.
68. In fact, in the few official statements 1have found explaining the position and role on the
United States government in the 1995 Ecuadorian-Peruvian crisis, Assistant Secretary for Inter-
American Affa irs, Alexander Watson, explains that the guarantors' job "was not to resolve the
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February 2, President Bill Clinton wrote to Presidents Fujimori and Durán Ballén urging both to
accept a cease-fire. The next day, Michael D. McCurry, the White House spokesman, said:
"The United States is prepared to participate in a mission to observe a cease-fire once one is in
place. ,,69 These efforts pale in light of those made by South American diplomats and heads of
states, and next to U.S. involvement in Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia, etc. For instance, President
Carlos Menem of Argentina admitted on one occasion that throughout the contlict he talked on
the telephone seven or eight times with his counterparts in Ecuador and Peru urging both to
ceas e fighting. 70 At any rate, the turning point in this conflict carne after more than seven days
of high-Ievel negotiations in Brasilia, when Peru declared a unilateral truce on Tuesday,
February 14.71 Shortly thereafter, Ecuador accepted that offer and at 12 noon, Friday, February
17, the cease-fire went into effect officially.
To conclude, the record demonstrates that the January 1995 Ecuadorian-Peruvian
conflict, as the previous two other crises in 1941 and 1981, was neither prevented nor
successfully sol ved by the hegemonic role of the United States. These crises generated out of
their own complex dynamics. Despite the poor and militarily weak conditions of the
belligerents, there was very Iittle the U.S. and other regional powers could do, short of outright
coercion, to prevent them from fighting.
underlying dispute by any rneans, but to try to end the current fighting, stop the bloodshed, and,
if we could, set up a mechanism by which the underlying dispute could be addressed in an
effective way." He further elaborates, "the Rio Protocol does not give to the guarantor countries
authority to determine or impose a solution." Moreover, he discloses, "the Brazilians are the
leaders of the guarantor group." He also indicates that "[the United States] will be fully
committed and prepared to work intensely with Peru and Ecuador as may be required." For the
complete version of this briefing, see U.S . Department of State, Dispatch . Washington, D.C. :
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995, Vol. 6, No. 7 (February 13, 1995). 24-26. In another
official U.S. policy statement towards the Americas in 1995, Assistant Secretary for Inter-
American Affairs, Alexander Watson, acknowledges once again the importance of "Brazil's
leadership within the Group of Guarantors of the Peru-Ecuador Protocol of Rio," and
characterizes the roles of the United Sta tes, Argentina, and Chile as those of "energetically"
contributing partners. See U.S. Department of State, Dispatch, Vol. 6 No. 21 (May 22, 1995) .
The recognition of Brazil's leadership in this contlict is emphasized again by Thomas F.
McLarty I1I, Counselor to the President and Secretary of State for the Summit of the Americas,
when in an address to the Council of the Americas in Washington, D.C. he points out that:
"Under Brazil's valued leadership and with the welcome participation of Argentina and Chile.
we remain committed to assisting the parties to reach a long-term solution on the underlying
issues." U.S. Department of State, Dispatch, Vol. 6 No. 22 (May 29, 1995) .46. For other major
U.S. policy statements toward the Americas in 1995, see U.S. Department of State, Dispatch ,
Vol. 6 No. 24 (June 12, 1995). 1-5.
69. As quoted by James Brooke, "Peru and Ecuador Wage Guerrilla War as Talks Break Off,"
The New York Times, Monday, February 6,1995.5.
70. James Brooke, "Fighting Intensifies Along Peru-Ecuador Border," The New York Times,
Friday, February 3,1995.8.
71. The New York Times, Tuesday, February 14, 1995. 8.
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Intemational coercion is a statecraft tool that the U.S. has been unwilling to utilize in
the southem half of the Westem hemisphere to prevent intraregional interstate conflicto Hence,
the role of the U.S. has been relegated to being a mediator instead of an enforcer of
intraregional interstate peace . Accordingly, whenever hostilities have broken out in the past,
several countries, including the United Sates, have played a part in bringing the two disputants
to the bargaining table . However, negotiations have not solved the basic territorial problem, at
least in the Ecuadorian-Peruvian dispute, and the seed of discord and potential for armed
conf1ict still lingers in the bilateral relations between Ecuador and Peru.
5. THE BEAGLE CHANNEL DISPUTE BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND CHILE
Historically, relations between Argentina and Chile have been affected by as many as
twenty-five different territorial disputes along their 2,500-mile border.Í" Since the 1870's, their
boundary question has involved three distinct geographical areas: the inter-Andean plateaus
between the eastem and westem heights of the Andes, the Patagonia region, and the Strait of
Magellan and Tierra del Fuego. Among these, the latter zone has proven to be the most salient
and difficult to settle and demarcate.
During its early years as an independent and unified state, Argentina was less
interested than Chile in controlling the Strait ofMagellan and the Tierra del Fuego. However, in
the late 1870's Argentina changed its foreign policy objective and decided to cha11enge Chile's
jurisdictional claim over this region . The ensuing controversy was initially settled after
Argentina and Chile, with the help of United States mediation, negotiated and signed a
boundary treaty on July 23, 1881. This agreement stipulated that Chile would give up its claim
to the Patagonia in exchange for Argentina's acceptance of Chilean sovereignty over the entire
Strait of Magellan . Moreover, Chile accepted neutralization of the strait, and Argentina agreed
never to block the Atlant ic access to and egress from the strait. Finally, a provision was made
for the division of Tierra del Fuego between Argentina and Chile, and for the arbitration of
disputes arising over interpretation ofthe treaty's terms.73
The issue of how to divide Tierra del Fuego and define the line between the South
Atlantic and South Pacific has proven to be quite intractable. At the center of this controversy
figures three small islands (Nueva, Pictón, and Lennox) at the eastem entrance to the Beagle
Channel. Since neither the limits of this channel, nor the ownership of these islands were ever
clearly defined in the boundary treaty of 1881, Argentina challenged the eastemmost point of
72. For background information to a11 these controversies, see Allcock, el. al., 3rd ed., Border
and Territorial Disputes . 548-549; Ireland, Boundaries, Possessions, and Conjlicts in South
America. 17-27; and El Universal Caracas , Venezuela, Wednesday, July 31, 1991. 3.
73. For a general discussion ofthe early stages ofthe Argentine-Chilean territorial controversy
in the Strait ofMagellan and the Tierra del Fuego, see Burr, By Reason or Force. 111-113, 124-
126, 132-135, 144-146 , and for a specific discussion of the 1881 boundary treaty between
Argent ina and Chile , see 155-156, 184-186, and 206. Also, see del Carril , Bonifacio. La
Cuestión con Chile. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Emecé Editores S.A., 1984. 54-64.
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Chilean sovereignty involving the possession of these three islands. In a series of boundary
treaties, known as "Pactos de Mayo," signed on "May 28, 1902, Argentina succeeded in
obtaining from Chile the concession that the islands were negotiable and should be submitted to
arbitration by the British Crown. 74 This is the inception of the so-called Beagle Channel
dispute, which brought Argentina and Chile to the brink of war in late 1978.75
Except for the signing on June 28, 1915 of a protocol, reiterating the submission for
arbitration of the ownership of the islands in the Beagle Channel, the matter remained dormant
until May 3, 1938. On that occasion, the Foreign Ministers of Argentina and Chile informed the
U.S. Ambassador in Chile, Norman Armour, that they had agreed to resubmit to arbitration the
question of the islands at the eastem end of the Beagle Channel. They agreed to rely on asole
arbitrator and they chose for that position the Chief Justice ofthe United States. However, when
Chief Justice Hughes excused himself, the two states requested the services of U.S. Attomey
General, Homer Cummings?6
Subsequent to Cummings' failed mediation attempt in the 1940's, the British Crown
took up the matter again in 1971. Weary of British neutrality because of its own territorial
dispute in the South Atlantic with the United Kingdom, Argentina insisted that the arbitration
arrangement be changed so that the actual judgment would be made by an impartial panel of
five members of the Intemational Court of Justice at The Hague. In early 1977 the British
Crown announced the ruling confirming Chile's sovereign right over the disputed islands. Then,
in December 1977 Argentina threatened to declare the arbitration not binding and stated that it
would pursue the matter in bilateral negotiations with Chile.77
74. Forthe historical background to the Pactos de Mayo, see Burr, By Reason or Force . 247-
256.
75. For background information to this crisis, see Rizzo Romano, Alfredo. La Cuestión de
Límites con Chile en la Zona del Beagle. Buenos Aires : Ediciones Pleamar, 1968; Santibáñez
Escobar, Rafael. Los Derechos de Chile en el Beagle. Santiago de Chile: Editorial Andrés
Bello, 1969; F.V. , "The Beagle Channel Affair," American Journal ofInternational Law, No.
71 (October 1977) . 733-740; Ruggeri, Andrés. "Canal de Beagle. Algunas Reflexiones Sobre el
Laudo Austral," Estrategia , No. 45 (March-April 1977).48-60; Hugo G. Gobbi, "Problemas
Australes Argentino-Chilenos," Estrategia, No. 48 (September-October 1977). 27-36 ; Olivera,
Dario A. "Caso Beagle: Antecedentes," Revista Argentina de Relaciones Internacionales, Year
IV, No . II (May-August 1978). 62-72; Juan E. Guglialmelli, "Cuestión del Beagle.
Negociación Directa o Diálogo de Armas," Estrategia, Nos. 49 and 50 (January-February
1978). 5-22; and Villalobos, Sergio. El Beagle: Historia de una Controversia. Santiago, Chile:
Editorial Andrés Bello, 1979. For a useful summary of the dispute, see Schumacher, Edward.
"Three Small Islands Loom Large In Argentine Leader's Plans," The New York Times,
Thursday, January 5, 1984. 16.
76. Foreign Relations ofthe United States, Diplomatic Papers 1938.210-217.
77. Caviedes, César. The Southern Cone: Realities ofthe Authoritarian State in South America.
Totowa, NJ : Rowman & Allanheld, 1984 . 155-156; and Child, Geopolitics and Conflict in
South America: Quarrels Among Neighbors. 80-81 ; The New York Times , Sunday, Janu ary 15,
1978.9.
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Bilateral negotiations between Argentina and Chile began on January 14, 1978 when
General Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda, former director of Chile's intelligence agency, delivered
a proposa l from Pres ident Augusto Pinochet to Pres ident Jo rge Rafael Videla of Argentina.78
The two military presidents met privately for five hours on January 19.79 But the meeting was a
fias co : five days later, on January 25, Argentina officially "repudiated" the international
arbitration dec ision .80 The stage was set for what , up to 1978, pro ved to be the most serious
mili tarized cris is in South America since the 1941 Ecuadorian-Peruvian conflict.
The rhet or ic coming out of Argentina and Chile became increasingly bellicose. By
Aug us t 197 8, bilateral negotiations had reached an impasse, and the negotiators fixed
November 2, 1978 as the final date to arrive at an agreement. 81 In September and October of
1978 the tempo of acrimo nious allegations ~icked up with both sides accusing each other of
troop movements and illegal incursions.Í When the November 2 deadline carne, the
nego tiators for both countries announced that they had not been able to work out an agreement,
but that the y wou ld urge their respective governments to seek a peaceful solution to the
d . 83ispute.
Whil e Argentina increased pressure on Chile by demanding a "total accord as soon as
possi ble," Ch ile proposed that the two countries should submit the dispute to a friendly nation,
like Spain, for arbitration. Th is proposal was rejected out right by Argentina, asserting that
"di rec t negotiat ion s are the suitable way to resolve disputes.,,84 Consequently, the Beagle
Channel dispute had ushe red in the most dangerous and bellicose six weeks in the recent history
of Argentine-Chilean relations . Belligerent statements from both governments, deployment of
armored forces alo ng the border, naval maneuvers near the Beagle Channel , and troop
movements led both countries "to be four hour s away" from a major mil itary conflagration on
December 23, 1978.85 War was averted when Pope John Paul Il agreed to arbitrate the dispute
78. The New York Times, Thursday, January 19, 1978. 2.
79. The New York Times, Friday, Janu ary 20, 1978. 2.
80. Juan de Onís, "Argentina Rejects Ruling on 3 Islands," The New York Times , Thursday,
January 26, 1978. 6.
81. The New York Times, Supp lementary Material , August 29 , 1978 . 118.
82. The New York Times , Supplementary Material , September 27, 1978. 57; Ibid. ,
Supplementary Materia l, October 17, 1978. 39; and Ibid., Supplementary Material, October 25,
1978.65.
83. The New York Times, Supplementary Material , November 3, 1978. 26.
84. The New York Times, Supplementary Material , November 4, 1978.48.
85. Scheina, Latin America: A Nava/ History, 18/0-/ 987 . 187; Juan de Onís, "Argentina and
Chile Break Off Talks Over Rejects lslands ." The New York Times, Thursday, December 14,
1978.3; and Juan de Onís, "Argentina, Chi le Feud Masks Other Troubles," Ibid., Sund ay,
December 31, 1978, Section IV. 3.
The Pax Americana and its implications ... 117
and Argentina accepted his mediating role. 86 Finally, on January 23, 1984 the Vatican
announced that Argentina and Chile had reached an agreement regarding the Beagle Channel
dispute and the delineation oftheir respective territories.Í"
Throughout the time leading up to the major crisis between Argentina and Chile and
during the six weeks of tense crisis, the role of the United States government was consistent
with its previous position in other interstate disputes in South America in the post-Chaco War
periodo The Carter administration urged both governments to avoid war and to find a peaceful
solution to their territorial dispute. It asked the Organization of American States to intervene in
the dispute. But all U.S. efforts were to no avail in settling the dispute.88
1 have found no evidence indicating that the U.S. government leaned heavily on either
of the two parties in the dispute to prevent or solve the Beagle Channel controversy. In fact, it
appears that the U.S. government kept a distance from this imbroglio. For instance, during the
time when Argentine and Chilean negotiators were trying to settle their territorial dispute ,
President Jimmy Carter, addressing the O.A.S General Assembly, recalled the com ing
centennial anniversary of the War of the Pacific between Chile and Peru, and pledged to view
this occasion "as an opportunity to reaffirm our commitment to harmony in this hemisphere and
to avoid conflict." While he mentioned that other disputes (i.e. , Bolivia's access to the sea , the
Honduras-El Salvador border dispute, and the future of Belize) in our hemisphere could "be
settled peacefully," he failed to even allude to the ongoing discussions between Argentina and
Chile over the disputed Beagle Channel. 89 Similarly, at the height ofthis crisis on December
14, 1978, in a major U.S. policy address to the Pan American Society of the United States in
New York, Assistant Secretary for Inter-Arnerican Affairs , Viron P. Vaky did not even mention
h &'. '1 d . . 90t e rai e negotianons.
86. de Onís, Juan. "Argentina and Chile Accept Papal Effort in Dispute," The New York Times ,
Sunday, December 24, 1978. 6; and "Keeping the Peace Around Cape Horn," The New York
Times, Thursday, December 28, 1978. 16.
87. The New York Times , Tuesday, January 24, 1984. 3. A final treaty ending the Beagle
Channel dispute between Argentina and Chile was signed in the Vatican on November 29,
1984, see Ibid., Friday, November, 30, 1984. 5. For more information of the mediating role
played by the Vatican, see Fraga, Jorge Alberto. "Beagle. Hablar Con Claridad al Sumo
Pontífice," Estrategia, No. 69 (1981) . 62-66 ; Güido , Claudio. "El Beagle, La Iglesia, y América
Latina," Cuadernos de Iglesia y Sociedad. No. 8 and 9. Buenos Aires, 1984; and Vio
Valdivieso, Fabio. La Mediación de s.s. El Papa Juan Pablo II en el Conflicto Chileno-
Argentino Sobre Delimitación de Juridicciones Marítimas en la Zona Austral. Santiago de
Chile: Editorial Aconcagua, 1984.
88. The New York Times, Wednesday, December 13, 1978, p. 6; and Ibid. , Saturday, December
16,1978.7.
89. As reprinted in U.S. Department ofState, Bulletin, Vol. 78, No. 2018 . Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978.54-57.
90. As reprinted in U.S. Department of State, Bul/etin . Vol. 79, No. 2024. Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979.64-67.
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In sum, the only allusion to the Beagle Channel crisis and the successful mediation by
Pope John Paul II in late 1978 was U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's expression of
appreciation to the Holy See "for undertaking to mediate the long-standing and troubling
differences between Argentina and Chile concerning the Beagle Channel.,,9J As is evident from
the aboye discussion, it was Vatican, not U.S. diplomacy, that was the determining factor in
preventing the outbreak of hostilities and find ing the solution to the long-running dispute
between Argentina and Chile over the Beagle Channel. In this vein, I surmise from this case
that the hegemonic role ofthe U.S. had very little to do with the maintenance ofinterstate peace
in South America in the post Chaco-War periodo
6. THREE MILITARlZED CRISES IN SOUTH AMERICA
First , Venezuela and Colombia have been involved in a low intensity, but long-running
feud over the GulfofVenezuela, the Los Monjes archipelago, and the Guajira Peninsula.Í" The
origin of this dispute stems from opposite claims from both countries as to what constitutes the
line dividing the seabed and territorial waters in the Gulf of Venezuela and near the Los Monjes
islands .
In 1939 the two countries signed the Treaty of Non-aggression, Conciliation,
Arbitration, and Judicial Settlement of Border Demarcation and Navigation. This agreement
was intended to settle all territorial disputes between Colombia and Venezuela, but since its
signing many inf1uential Venezuelans, including members of the military, have disavowed the
treaty as overly "generous" with Colombia and as a "treasonous mutilation of Venezuelan
sovereignty.T" Consequently, in March 1981 the Venezuelan Supreme Court accepted a plea to
abrogate the 1939 treaty with Colombia.
91. See U.S. Secretary ofStates Cyrus Vanee address to the ninth regular session ofthe General
Assembly of the Organization of American States in La Paz, Bolivia, October 23, 1979. As
reprinted in U.S . Department of State, Bulletin. Vol. 79, No. 2033. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1979.65.
92. For general background on this territorial dispute, see Curiel , José. Venezuela Mutilada.
Caracas, Venezuela: Libreria Historia, 1981; Vázquez Carrizosa, Alfredo. Las relaciones de
Colombia y Venezuela: La Historia Atormentada de Dos Naciones . Bogotá, Colombia:
Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1983; Ojer, Pablo. El Golfo de Venezuela: Una Síntesis Histórica.
Maracaibo, Venezuela: Corporación de Desarrollo de la Región Zulina, 1983; Rojas Cabot,
Román and Edmundo Viña Laborde. Al Otro Lado del Golfo. Colombia Refuta a Colombia.
Caracas, Venezuela: Impresos Urbina , C.A., 1984; Zalamea, Alberto. Catálogo de Errores : La
Crisis Colombo- Venezolana . Bogotá, Colombia: Oveja Negra, 1987; Antonio Aguilera, Jesús.
Las Fronteras de Venezuela. Caracas, Venezuela: Ediciones del Congreso de la República de
Venezuela, 1988 ; and Toro Hardy , Alfredo. La Maldición de Sisifo: Quince Años de Política
Externa Venezo lana. Caracas, Venezuel a: Editorial Panapo, 1991. 9-30.
93. See the discussion of this point by Child, Geopo/itics and Conflict in Soutñ America:
Quarrels Among Neighbors. 153-155.
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The Venezuelan Supreme Court decision on the 1939 treaty was viewed in Colombia
as an indication that Venezuela was becoming more aggressive and less open to comprom ise. In
the 1970's and early 1980's the bargaining position of both countries hardened and a settlement
became increasingly difficult to achieve. The matter carne to a head on the evening of
Wednesday, August 5, 1987, when the Venezuelan Ambassador to Colombia, Luís La Corte ,
handed to President Virgilio Barco Vargas the official Venezuelan rejection of the Colombian
proposal to rejoin the Permanent Conciliation Commission and settle the territorial differences
between the two countries.94
The territorial dispute between Colombia and Venezuela reached a serious impasse on
Sunday, August 9, 1987 when Colombia tried to force the issue by f1exing its military muscle .
On that occasion, the Colombian Navy stationed the war corvette, "A.R.e. Caldas " less than a
mile south of the Castilletes parallel, inside what Venezuela defines as its territorial waters in
the GulfofVenezuela. This navy vessel remained in that location until Tuesday, August 18.95
As might be expected, the "Caldas incident," as it became known in Colombia and
Venezuela, caused a national uproar in Venezuela. Not only ultra-nationalist elements, but all
segments of Venezuelan society called for a military response to Colombia's provocation.
Acceding to public demands, President Jaime Lusinchi ordered the Venezuelan armed forces on
full alert along the Colombian border, and sent a stem message to his Colombian counterpart
demanding the relocation of the corvette Caldas to Colombian territorial waters. AIso, he
requested an official explanation of the incident and the resumption of direct diplomatic
negotiations between the two countries as soon as possible.96 Fortunately, Colombia acceded
several days later and moved the corvette Caldas back inside its territorial waters .97 Then, both
countries pledged to continue negotiations toward a long-lasting peaceful settlement of this
controversy. Notwithstanding the absence of a final solution to the territorial dispute between
Colombia and Venezuela,98 the " Caldas incident" was solved peacefully through short-term
bilateral negotiations, and without the mediation of any intemational actor.
Second, Venezuela is also part of a territorial dispute with Guyana over the Essequibo
94. El Tiempo, Santa Fe de Bogotá, Colombia, 14 August 1987. I and 8.
95. Bogotá Inravisión, Televisión Cadena I in Spanish, 16 August 1987 in Foreign Broadcast
lnformation Service (FBIS-LAT-87-158), 17 August 1987.03; El Tiempo, Santa Fe de Bogotá ,
Colombia, 19 August 1987. 1; and Alan Riding, "Two Claims ofTerritory Roil Waters in Gulf
of Venezuela," The New York Times , 28 August 1987.2.
96. AFP in Spanish (Paris), 13 August 1987 in Foreign Broadcast lnformation Service (FBIS-
LAT-87-157), 14 August 1987. TI.
97. For the late night national message, delivered by Colombian President Virgilio Barcos
Vargas announcing the decision, see AFP in Spanish (Paris), 18 August 1987 in For eign
Broadcast Information Service (FBIS-LA T-87- 159), 17 August 1987. 07; and El Tiempo, Santa
Fe de Bogotá, Colombia, 18 August 1987. I and 9-e.
98. See El Universal, Caracas, Venezuela, 31 July 1991. I and 14.
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territ ory.99 In 1899 Great Britain and Venezuela reached an agreement, which established the
prese nt boun dary between Guyana and Venezuela. Howe ver , in 1962 Venezuela unilaterally
dec1ared the arbitra l accord null and void, c1aiming that there had been certain irregularities in
the original treaty of 1899.
In 1966 Great Britain, Guyana, and Venezuela signed a protocol establishing a mixed
border comm ission to arbitrate and settle the Essequibo dispute. By 1970 no settlement had
been reached and a second accord, known as The Prot ocol of Port of Spa in, went into effect.
This agreement pro vided for a twel ve-ye ar "cooling off period" to be renewed automatically
unless either Guyana or Venezuela objected to it. On December 11, 1981 Venezuela announced
that it wo uld not renew the Protocol of Port of Spain, due to expire on June 17, 1982. Instead,
Venezuela requested the arb itra tion of the U.N . Secretary General.lOO On May 10, and on
September 3 and 5, 1982 respe ctively , Guyana forrnerly protested to the U.N . Security Council
over alleged border incursions into its territory by Venezuelan soldiers. 101 The Venezuela
authorit ies dismissed these complaints as "propaganda." 102 Finally, on March 28, 1983, Guyana
acceded to Venezuela's peti tion for U.N. mediation, but no further progress has been made on
this territorial dispute. Fortunately, the issue has remained dorrnant and there have been no
addit ional militarized border incidents between the two states.
Third, in another development along the Venezuelan border with Brazil, a unit from
the Venezuelan Nationa l Guard border patrol c1ashed with Brazilian gold miners, or
"garimpei ros ," who entered Venezuelan territory to dig out gold and encroach on the
Yanomam i Ind ian territory. In sep arate incidents, Venezuelan arrny units fired at Brazilian
private planes overflying the area . In one instance, the Venezuelans shot down a small , private
99. For this brief histo rica l background 1 have relied on Rout, Leslie B. Which Way Out? An
Analysis of the Venezuelan-Guyana Border Dispute. East Lansing : Michigan State University,
Latin American Studies Center, 1971. Rafael Angel Sureda De lgado , Betancourt and Leoni en
la Guaya na Esequiba (Caracas, Venezuela: Universidad Central de Venezuela, Facultad de
Ciencias Eco nómicas y Soc iale s, División de Pub licac ione s, 1984) ; Rafael Angel Sureda
Delgado, La Guyana Esequiba: Dos Etapas en la Aplicación del Acuerdo de Ginebra (Caracas,
Venezuela: Bibliote ca de la Academia Nacional de la Hist or ia, 1990); Guyana, Ministry of
Economic Plann ing and Finance, Guyana 's Upper-Mazaruni Hydro -electric Project
(Georgetown, Guyana: Min istry of Economic Planning and Finance, 1981) ; and Jacquel ine
Anne Brav eboy -Wagner, The Venezuela-Guyana Border Dispute: Britain's Colonial Legacy in
Latin America (Bo ulder , Colorado: Westview Pres s, 1984).
100. Lati n-Reute r in Span ish (Buenos Aires ), II December 1981 in Foreign Broadcast
lnformation Service (FBIS), Vol. VI No . 240, 15 Decemb er 1981. L 1.
101. Bridgetown CANA in Englis h (Georgetown, Guyana), 2 May 1982 in Foreign Broadcast
Information Service (FBIS), Vol. VI No . 089, 7 May 1982. T 1.
102. See EFE (Ma drid) in Spanish, 9 September 1982 in Foreign Broadcast Information
Service (FBIS), Vol. VI No . 175, 8 September 1982. VI ; and Keesin g 's Contempo rary
Archiv es . Vol. XXX . London: Keesing Publ ishers, Ltd ., 1984.3 1066.
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plane , killing five mine rs on board . 103 This incident led Venezuela to launch a formal protest
against Brazil, which in turn agreed to curtail the operations of gold miners along the
Venezuelan-Brazilian border in the Amazon j ungle. Again , this case was resol ved without the
intervention or mediation of any third party and further escalation of hostilities were prevented
in South Ameri ca.
These three minor disputes illustrate the potentiality for interstate-armed conf1ict that
has prevailed in South America. They also reveal that unstable peace is maintained via other
sufficient conditions short of outright U.S. mandate in the region. Among these three crises, the
most threatening to regional peace and U.S. interests in the area was the "Caldas incident"
between Colombia and Venezuela. Once again, I found no evidence indicating any type ofU.S.
involvement aimed at preventing or settling the dispute. I 04 Moreove r, these crises have been
temporarily settled without the mediating efforts of a plethora of international actors in contrast
to the Ecuadorian-Peruvian and Argentine-Chilean crises .
7. RECEIVING END: SOUTH AMERICAN COMPLIANCE WITH U.S. INTEREST
In the final analysis, the peacemaking and/or peacekeeping impact ofthe United States
on the South American Peace appears inconclusive. Despite its public commitment to the
prevention and resolution of armed conf1ict in South America, several militarized crises have
occurred in the post-Chaco-War periodoThese incidents evince the inability of the U.S. to
control unilaterally events in South America, especially the maintenance of interstate peace and
stability. The record shows that albeit the absence of major intraregional wars since 1935, there
have been several instances revealing that when nations are bent on fighting each other for what
they deem to be their national interests, there is very little the U.S. government can do to
prevent it. Short of a unilateral military intervention to enforce peace , the U.S. possesses just as
much leverage as any large South American state. And the record demonstrates that the U.S.
has been reluctant to intervene militarily in South America, even when it has involved either its
strategic interests, or when it has been a relatively easy case in which to prevent the outbreak of
hostilities.1 05
103. Brooke, James. "'Mineral Prov ince' Divides Brazil and Venezuela," The New York Times ,
l a February 199 1. 7; and Idem ., "Venezuela's Polic y for Brazil's Gold Miners: Bullets," The
New York Times. 16 February 1992. 20.
104. I base my assertion on the extent I was able to find relevant materi al in U.S. Department of
State , Bulletin for the period in quest ion. See U.S. Department of State , Bulletin . Vol. 87, Nos.
2124-2129. Washington, D.e. : Government Prin ting Office, 1987. Even in the only major
newspaper article in the U.S. on the Cald as incident, there was no single reference to U.S.
policy and/or position on the contro versy. To corroborate , see The New York Times , Friday, 28
August 1987.2.
105. l have in mind two cases here, a lthough they fall outside the sco pe of my analysis. First,
the reticence on the part of the U.S. to intervene and prevent the outbreak of hostilit ies between
El Salvador and Hondu ras in the now infamous Football War of 1969; second, during the South
Atlantic confrontation between the United Kingdom and Argentina in 1982. In neither case did
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The relation between U.S. hegemony and intraregional interstate peace appears
tenuous at best when we compare the degree and frequency of U.S. political involvement and
military interventions in other major regions of the world and in South America in particular.
As demonstrated aboye, since late in the nineteenth century the United States has been active in
promoting peace and security in South America as a way to advance its global strategic
objectives by preventing or denying involvement opportunities to other great power rivals. Such
a goal has partially guided U.S. foreign policy, particularly since 1945, in every other major
region of the world from Africa to the Middle East. Specifically in South America, the United
States sought that objective through a combination of diplomatic and covert political
involvements in all intraregional conflicts and militarized disputes. But in comparative terms
from region to region this kind ofbehavior is insignificant. The evidence shows that since 1935
the U.S. has intervened politically and militarily more frequently and with greater strength in
interstate conflicts and militarized disputes in Africa, Asia, Central America, the Caribbean
basin, and the Middle East than in South America. Yet, these other regions have experienced
more intraregional interstate violence since 1935 than has South America. Clearly, this
contradicts the argument linking U.S. hegemony to the absence of intraregional interstate
conflict in South America.
Partial indication supporting the a boye conclusion is presented subsequently in table 1,
where 1 translate the target territory code numbers of all U.S. foreign overt military
interventions from 1945 to 1991. This table contains data extracted from a much larger database
describing 690 instances of foreign overt military interventions worldwide in the time period
specified aboye. As it is evident from this table, the U.S. intervened militarily abroad thirty
times: thirteen times in Asia, seven times in the Middle East and in the Central American-
Caribbean basin regions respectively, once in Europe, and twice in Africa. While most ofthese
U.S. military interventions did not aim to preserve intraregional interstate peace in other
regions, the much greater degree of U.S. military muscle -flexing in regions other than South
America renders, at least, as exaggerated, if not preposterous, the claim that the origin of the
Peace in South America is the direct consequence of U.S. hegemony and/or military
preponderance in the region.
the U.S. choose to coerce the belligerents to sue for peace and avoid war at all costs. This is
proof that despite what sorne experts claim as the direct responsibility of the U.S. to maintain
intraregional peace in South America, the role of the U.S. in this endeavor is mixed or
inconclusive. The South American peace is not an automatic result ofU.S. hegemonic power in
the region .
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Table 1
United States Overt Military Interventions Abroad, 1945-1991
Source: Tillema, Herbert K. "Foreign Overt Military Interventions, September 2, 1945
December 31, 1991." Columbia, MO: Department of Political Science , University of
Missouri, Ma rch 31,1997.
Tarzet Territory Beginning Ending Name ofIntervention
South Korea 09/08/45 08/15 /48 Korean Occupation
P. Reo. of China 09/30/45 09/06/46 American Guard Duties
South Kore a 06/27/50 07/27/53 Korean War
North Korea 06/30/50 07/27/53 Korean War
Trieste 11/06/53 11/06/53 Trieste Riots
Reoublic of China 02/07/55 02/11 /55 Tachens Evacuation
Lebanon 07/15/58 10/25/58 Lebanese Civil War
Panama Canal 11/03/59 11/30/59 Panama Demonstrations
Zone
South Vietnam 03/22/62 01/27/73 Vietnamese War
South Korea 07/29/63 11/03/63 Korean Conf1ict
Panama 01/09/64 01/16/64 Panama Flag Riots
Laos 06/08/64 08/15/73 Vietnamese Civil War
North Vietnam 08/04/64 0 1/27/73 Vietnamese Civ il War
Dominican Reo. 04/28/65 09/21 /66 Dominican Rep. Civil War
South Korea 11/18/65 10/18/69 Korean Conf1ict
Cambodia 09/20/66 08/15/73 Vietnamese War
South Vietnam 04/28/75 04/29/75 Saigon Evacuations
Vietnam 05/14/75 05/15/75 Mavazuez Incident
Iran 04/24/80 04/25/80 Tehran Rescue Mission
Leban on 08/25/82 03/26/84 Multilateral Force
Grenada 10/25/83 12/15/83 Operation Urgent Fury
Libva 03/24/86 04/15/86 Libva Raids
Virz in Islands 09/21/89 10/31/89 SI. Croix Disaster
Panama 12/20/89 04/30/90 Panama Invasión
Kuwait 01/17/90 02/28/91 GulfWar
Liberia 08/05/90 08/19/90 Monrovia Evacuation
Panama 12/05/90 12/05/90 Herrera's Mutiny
Somalia 01/05 /91 01/05 /91 Somalia Evacuation
.Iraq 01/17/91 07/15/91 Desert Storm
Saudi Arabia 01/29/91 01/30/91 Khafii Defense
..
